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 Carbon Leakage with Forestation Policies 
 
Harry de Gorter, Dusan Drabik, and David R. Just 
 
Abstract 
This paper analyzes carbon leakage due to reduced emissions from deforestation (RED). We find 
that leakage with RED is good because the policy induces afforestation that contributes to a 
further carbon sequestration. By ignoring the domestic component of carbon leakage, the 
literature can either overestimate or underestimate leakage, depending on the magnitudes of the 
numerator and the denominator of the leakage formulas. Unlike the literature, we include the 
land and agricultural markets in the analysis of carbon leakage with forestation policies. In this 
model, carbon leakage depends on: (1) supply and demand elasticities of timber production and 
consumption, respectively in the country introducing a RED policy (Home country) and in the 
rest of the world; (2) Home country‟s production and consumption share in the world timber 
production and consumption, respectively; (3) prices of land and crop products in the Home 
country and the rest of the world; (4) initial allocation of land between forestry and agriculture; 
(5) share of total forest area  set aside under RED; and (6) relative carbon sequestration potential 
of the forest planted on an afforested land and of the forest withdrawn from timber harvest. 
These potentials depend heavily on the forest species as well as on timing of the policy, and on 
the discount rate and time path of increasing carbon prices. 
 
JEL: Q23, Q24, Q54 
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1.  Introduction 
Parties to the Kyoto Protocol and successive negotiations on global climate change in 
Copenhagen and Cancun have been reluctant to expand the use of carbon offsets related to land 
use and land use change in the forestry and agricultural sectors in order to reduce carbon 
emissions.
1 One of the primary reasons is „carbon leakage‟, i.e., a possibility that emissions are 
simply shifted to another location or sector as a result of a change in market forces resulting from 
the economic effects of carbon offsets. Drabik, de Gorter and Just (2010) show carbon leakage 
has two components: „market leakage‟ and „relative carbon emissions‟ (or savings in the case of 
forestation policies). In this paper, we adapt this framework for one forest policy that affects land 
use and land use change – avoided deforestation – also known as reduced emissions from 
                                                 
1 For ease of reference, we use “carbon” to refer to all greenhouse gases emitted or sequestered as a result of a forest 
policy. 3 
 
deforestation (RED). Other “forestation” policies that are not analyzed in this paper include 
afforestation (AR), reforestation (RF), and forest management (FM). But as we show later, 
afforestation is a by-product of RED, while reforestation is shown to be part of the definition of 
timber harvest as firms reforest every year to maintain a sustainable harvest given a market price 
of timber. We do not analyze FM.  
We first analyze the market leakage effect of a RED policy, i.e., the changes in timber 
harvest due to the policy that occur both domestically and internationally. The standard literature 
on leakages of forestation policies (Murray, McCarl, and Lee 2004; Gan and McCarl 2007; 
Murray et al. 2009) takes into account only the timber (forestry) market when analyzing carbon 
leakage. We do the same only to introduce the basic concepts. Later, we nevertheless, provide an 
alternative definition of leakage that better accounts for the market reactions to forestation 
policies and reinterprets the meaning of leakage. Then we introduce land market and agricultural 
market, the latter representing all crop production for human and animal consumption. By 
ignoring the non-forestry markets, we show the standard literature overestimates leakage for two 
reasons: (1) market leakage is lower with the land market included and (2) the literature ignores 
the induced AR by that RED. 
  With the timber market only, market leakage depends on two sets of market parameters: 
(1) supply and demand elasticities of timber production and consumption, respectively in the 
country introducing a RED policy and in the rest of the world and (2) production and 
consumption share in the world timber production and consumption, respectively of the country 
introducing RED. When the land and agricultural markets are included, additional factors have 
an effect on market leakage: prices of land and crop products before the policy, the initial 4 
 
allocation of land between forestry and agriculture, and the share of total forest land set aside 
under RED. 
  Carbon leakage with a RED policy depends on domestic and international market 
leakages, but also on the relative carbon sequestration potential of the forest planted on an 
afforested area and of the forest withdrawn from timber harvest. The relative sequestration 
potential depends heavily on a forest species (that determines its carbon sequestration profile) as 
well as on the timing of the policy. 
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we develop an 
analytical framework to analyze market leakage with a RED policy. First we consider the timber 
market only and then extend the analysis to include the land and agricultural market. Section 3 
presents the relation between the carbon leakage and the market leakage and sequestration 
potential of a forest. We also discuss the role of carbon sequestration profile of a forest species in 
determining its sequestration potential. Section 4 provides some concluding remarks. 
2.  Market Leakage due to a RED Policy 
Timber Market with No Interactions with the Land Market 
Consider an international market for timber as depicted in Figure 1 where the world price of 
timber P0 is determined by the intersection of the excess demand curve ED of the Home country 
and the excess supply curve ES of the Foreign country.
2 Initially, a tonnes of timber are 
harvested annually in the Home country and d tonnes of timber are harvested in the Foreign 
country. Assume a RED policy is implemented in the Home country that sets aside an area of 
forest, i.e., timber cannot be harvested on that land for a fixed period of time.
3 This translates 
into a contraction of the Home timber supply which is depicted as a horizontal shift from S to S' 
                                                 
2 The results of the paper are independent of the country being an exporter or importer. 
3 The length of the period is typically specified in the contract of the project under the Clean Development 
Mechanism. 5 
 
(in the first panel of Figure 1) by the reduced quantity of timber Z.
4 The reduction in annual 
harvest of distance ba occurs provided the world timber price is unaffected by the RED policy. 
The shortage of timber in the Home country, however, increases the country‟s excess demand 
ED' which gives rise to a higher world timber price P1. With a higher market price, timber 
producers worldwide are incentivized to increase the annual rate of timber harvest. This 
corresponds to the distances bc and de in Figure 1 and the actual reduction in timber harvest is 
represented by the distance ca.  
Following the standard literature, market leakage in absolute terms would be defined only 
as the distance de in the second panel of Figure 1, termed international leakage, not taking into 
account domestic leakage of distance bc in the Home country. The argument for only 
considering the international leakage is that the internal response, i.e., domestic leakage, (and 
carbon emissions related to it) should be captured with a national accounting system and 
therefore does not constitute leakage (Murray 2008). However, pursuing this argument further, 
one could also account for the international leakage to achieve a desirable reduction in carbon 
emissions. Therefore, by not taking into consideration the domestic component of leakage, 
measures of leakage may be biased. 
In Appendix 1, we derive a simple formula for market leakage due to a RED policy when 
the land market is not considered: 
                                
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where denotes the Home country‟s share of world timber production; denotes the Home 
country‟s share of world timber consumption; anddenotes an elasticity. The first subscript S or 
                                                 
4 The amount of timber that is annually set aside due to a RED policy equals the ratio of land set aside to the total 
forest area, multiplied by the available amount of timber (per year) prior to the policy.  6 
 
D in each term signifies supply and demand, respectively, and the second subscript (H and F) 
denotes country; hence, e.g., SH  denotes the elasticity of timber production in the Home country. 
  Decomposing leakage into its domestic
D
M L and international
I
M L component, the relative 
share of domestic leakage depends on production shares and supply elasticities in both countries, 
but not on timber demand elasticities as leakage occurs only along the supply curves: 












                                                           (2)            
                 Inspection of equation (2) reveals that domestic leakage becomes more important 
relative to international leakage with both an increase in the Home country‟s share of world 
timber production and a higher supply elasticity. Therefore, if timber harvest of a country (or a 
coalition of countries) represents a substantial share of world timber production, the bias of 
market leakage estimates when ignoring domestic leakage might be substantial. Likewise, it is 
the case when the domestic supply of timber becomes more elastic.  
Equation (1) is very similar – in structure – to that derived by Drabik, de Gorter, and Just 
(2010) for market leakage with biofuels due to a tax credit. This similarity allows us to adopt two 
results of that study for forestation policies: (1) a small country in the world timber market does 
not always face 100 percent market or carbon leakage and (2) a smaller country can, under some 
situations, see lower leakage of its forestation policies compared to a larger country. 
Interactions with the Land and Agricultural Markets 
To keep the analysis tractable, consider the case of autarky for two output markets – the timber 
and the agricultural market.
5 Production of the outputs requires only one input – land, as depicted 
in Figures 2a and 2b. The market price of timber PT is where the demand for timber DT intersects 
                                                 
5 Agriculture is modeled as a composite sector that encompasses all crop production for human and animal 
consumption.  7 
 
the timber supply ST (first panel of Figure 2a); associated with this price is an amount of timber 
a. The intersection of the supply and demand curves, SA and DA, respectively, in the second panel 
of Figure 2a determines the market clearing price PA that generates a units of agricultural crop 
production (we use the same notation for corresponding points in all three panels in order to 
show how they are related). The timber and agricultural production compete in the land market 
as shown by Figure 2b. The curves DF and DA represent demand for forestry and agricultural 
land, respectively, and are implicitly given by the first order conditions of profit maximization 
for the timber and agricultural sectors. The land market price PL is where the two demand curves 
in Figure 2b intersect; the amount of land used for agricultural production LA is read off from the 
left to the right, whereas the amount of land allocated to timber production LT is read off from the 
right to the left in Figure 3b. Total area of land is fixed. 
  Assume a policy that reduces emissions from deforestation (RED) by preventing some 
area of forest to be cut down. Setting aside a part of forest can also be thought of as a 
corresponding reduction in timber harvest (denoted by Z), as the amount of timber contracts 
proportionally to the reduction in land set aside (see footnote 4). This is why we begin the 
analysis by shifting the timber supply curve horizontally to the left in the first panel of Figure 2a. 
Under the assumption that the timber price does not change, the intended reduction in timber 
harvest is given by the distance ba in the same panel. However, in order for the market to clear, 
the timber price has to rise to PT'. A higher timber price induces a higher timber harvest; this 
requires more land, which is depicted by the outward shift of the demand curve for forestry land, 
DF'. The fixed amount of land and stronger competition for it make the land market price 
increase to PL'. In a response, marginal cost of agricultural production increases and the supply 
curve of agricultural products moves up in the second panel of Figure 2a to SA' . Akin to 8 
 
developments in the timber market, a higher market price for agricultural production, PA', 
motivates farmers to obtain more land; hence the outward shift in the demand for agricultural 
land, DA' in Figure 2b.  
The shift in demand for agricultural land completes the first round of market reactions 
triggered by the RED policy. The mutual interaction of the timber and agricultural markets 
through the land market results in gradual adjustments of the system that finally converges to a 
new equilibrium. Let this new equilibrium be characterized by the quantity d in each of the three 
markets. Now we can evaluate what the market leakage of the RED policy is. When the land 
(and also agricultural) market is ignored, the market leakage in the timber sector is given by the 
distance bc in the first panel of Figure 2a (this corresponds to distance bc in Figure 1). The true 
market leakage, however, is given by the distance bd which is less than bc and is a result of the 
adjustments among all three markets. Therefore, by looking only at the timber market when 
evaluating the effects of forestation policies, the literature overestimates the market leakage. 
Another outcome of our model is that a RED policy, through an increase in timber prices, 
induces afforestation. This follows from Figure 2b, where the increase in land allocated to 
forestry is the distance da and it is positive. Therefore, the market leakage of bd, in the first panel 
of Figure 2a, corresponds to the new land allocated to forestry – distance da in Figure 2b. 
Because the total area of land is fixed, agricultural sector loses the same amount of land. 
The intuitive explanation of market leakage above is formalized in Appendix 3 that also 
provides a formula to estimate market leakage of a RED policy under integrated markets: 
                                         1 1 1 1
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where      L T T T P L P q   ,      L T A A P L P q   , F RL   , and denotes an elasticity.  
In words, α represents a ratio of the cost a timber producing firm pays for renting the land to the 
revenues from marketing the timber. The parameter β is a ratio of rent for land on which timber 
is produced to the revenues of the agricultural sector. Finally, the parameter γ denotes a share of 
land that is set aside in total forestry land. 
  Equation (3) shows that the magnitude of market leakage of a RED policy, in addition to 
the parameters α, β, and γ, depends heavily on the assumed supply and demand elasticities in the 
timber and agricultural markets. Should the formula be extended to an international trade 
framework, in addition to the Foreign country‟s parameters that are counterparts of those in 
equation (3), Home country‟s consumption and production shares of timber and agricultural 
products would also be determinants of market leakage. 
3.  Carbon Leakage 
The implication of our model, when the land market is included, is that the RED policy, through 
an increase in timber prices, induces afforestation. Although market leakage of the RED policy 
occurs, all is not lost because the new forest sequesters carbon from the atmosphere, thus 
providing carbon savings associated with increased timber harvest that represents leakage 
associated with the RED policy.  
The RED policy is usually implemented through projects with a pre-specified duration of 
T years. When an area of forest is withdrawn from timber harvest, the carbon savings occur as 
(i.) avoided carbon emissions from not harvesting the forest and (ii.) a continuation of carbon 
sequestration of that forest. 
The rates at which harvested timber releases carbon or a standing forest sequesters it are 
not constant and evolve in time. The first panel of Figure 3 shows a cumulative function of 10 
 
carbon released when a tonne of timber is harvested (dashed line). A value of that function at any 
point represents an amount of carbon accumulated in the atmosphere in the process of carbon 
release, starting at the time of harvest. The solid line in the first panel represents an instantaneous 
increment of carbon released. This function is typically decreasing over time, reflecting the 
observation that carbon is released at the fastest rate early after the timber harvest and then the 
rate decays over time. The area under the incremental carbon release curve measures the amount 
of carbon released over some period. For a RED policy it represents avoided carbon emissions 
from prevented harvest. 
The second panel of Figure 3 shows a similar concept as just presented; the only 
difference is that the dashed and solid curves represent cumulative carbon sequestration of the 
forest prevented from harvest and the instantaneous increment in the carbon sequestered, 
respectively. Those curves depict the carbon profile of an “old” forest, thus the project period 
starts at some time t0 (and not at the origin, as in the first panel). The area under the incremental 
emissions sequestration curve between the times t0 and t1 denotes the total carbon sequestration 
of the forest withdrawn from harvest over the project period. 
The total carbon savings of reduced timber production per tonne of timber are therefore: 








E S t dt S t dt

                                                         (4) 
and the average annual savings over the project duration are: 













                                                     (5) 
where the notation is the same as in Figure 3. 11 
 
Timber growing on a newly afforested land (induced by RED) sequesters carbon in two 
ways. First, the new forest sequesters carbon (the dashed curve in the third panel represents 
accumulation of sequestered carbon over time, while the solid curve depicts an instantaneous rate 
of sequestration). Second, there are avoided carbon emissions that would have resulted from the 
use of agricultural land (e.g., plowing) (fourth panel).
6 The total amount of carbon sequestered 
through induced afforestation is: 








E S t dt S t dt

                                                     (6) 
with average annual sequestration potential of 













                                                  (7) 
Equations 5 and 7 show that the average annual carbon savings and sequestration potentials 
depend not only on the duration of a RED project, but also on the curvature of the respective 
curves. 
  The above analysis complicates quickly when the project period is extended to infinity 
(for the purpose of a cost-benefit analysis) and carbon prices are incorporated. Since the latter are 
expected to rise (see, e.g., de Gorter and Tsur 2010), the amount of carbon saved will have a 
different social value. Equations (4) - (7) could be modified to reflect this. It is very possible that 
savings from AR (although not analyzed here) are higher than from RED. The third panel of 
Figure 3 shows higher savings later when carbon prices are higher so one cannot unambiguously 
                                                 
6 The cumulative emissions curve for agricultural land oscillates around the horizontal axis, reflecting the fact that 
agricultural plants are carbon-neutral by definition – the amount of carbon stored in the soil released at plowing is 
gradually sequestered in the next period through the process of photosynthesis. Provided that modern land-
cultivating technologies, such as zero-tillage, are used, plants can even store more carbon that released during their 
production. 12 
 
compare, for a given discount rate, because of the increasing carbon prices. The result depends 
on the curvature of the cumulative sequestration curves. 
 
4.  Conclusions 
The focus of the present paper was on carbon leakage with one of the forestation policies – 
reduced emissions from deforestation (RED). Our main finding is that leakage with RED is good 
because the policy induces afforestation that contributes to a further carbon sequestration. This 
finding is in stark contrast to the current literature on forestation leakages that ignores that RED 
induces afforestation. This is not the only important finding, however. By ignoring the domestic 
component of carbon leakage, the literature can either overestimate or underestimate leakage, 
depending on the magnitudes of the numerator and the denominator of the leakage formulas. Yet 
another advancement of our paper is the inclusion of the land and agricultural market in the 
analysis of carbon leakage with forestation policies. 
  In the model integrating all three markets, market leakage depends on: (1) supply and 
demand elasticities of timber production and consumption, respectively in the country 
introducing a RED policy (Home country) and in the rest of the world; (2) Home country‟s 
production and consumption share in the world timber production and consumption, 
respectively; (3) prices of land and crop products in the Home country and the rest of the world; 
(4) allocation of land between forestry and agriculture; and (5) share of total forest area  set aside 
under RED. 
  Carbon leakage, in addition to above factors, also hinges on the relative carbon 
sequestration potential of the forest planted on an afforested land and of the forest withdrawn 13 
 
from timber harvest. These potentials depend heavily on the forest species as well as on timing 
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Appendix 1: Formula for Market Leakage with a RED Policy, Trade, and No Land Market 
 
Market equilibrium with R hectares of forest – measured in the quantity of timber – set aside due 
to a RED policy is given by: 
                                                        H F H F D P D P S P S P R                                        (A1.1) 
where D denotes demand for timber, S supply of timber, P  world price of timber, and the 
subscripts H and F denote the Home and Foreign country, respectively. 
Totally differentiating (A1.1), we get: 
                                                   1 ' ' ' ' 0 H F H F dP dR S S D D                                          (A1.2) 
A change in Home country‟s timber production due to R hectares of forest set-aside is   
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                       (A1.3) 
Similarly for the change in timber production in the Foreign country: 
                                       
1
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                        (A1.4) 
where denotes elasticity. 
Total market leakage M L due to a RED policy is 
                                  ' ' ' ' M H F SH H SF F H F H F L dS dS R S S P S S D D                  (A1.5) 
After transformation of the derivatives of the demand and supply curves into their elasticity 
forms, we get the final formula for market leakage with a RED policy 
          1 1 1 M SH SF SH SF DH DF L                   
where    H H F D D D   and   H H F S S S   .  15 
 
Appendix 2: The Relation between the Curvature of a Production Function and Elasticity 
of a Product Supply Curve 
 
Assume  a  firm  that  uses  only  one  input  x  to  produce  an  output  q  through  a  production 
function   g  satisfying   00 g  , 0 x g  , and 0 xx g  , where the subscript denotes the derivative 
of the production function with respect to x. The firm seeks to minimize production costs  
                                                                min ,  . .: 
x C rx st g x q                                           (A2.1) 
where r denotes a price per unit of input x. 
  The properties of    g  guarantee that it has an inverse,h, such that     
1 g q h q x
  . 
The  cost  of  production  can  thus  be  written  as   C rh q  .  The  competitive  firm  equalizes  its 
marginal costs with a market price, p, of the product 
                                                              
q MC dC dq rh p                                                 (A2.2) 
Totally differentiating (A2-2) and rearranging, we obtain  
                                                                 
  1 qq dq dp rh                                                        (A2.3) 
By Inverse function theorem we have: 
                                                                       1 qx h q g h q                                                   (A2.4) 
Totally differentiating (A2-4) and rearranging yields: 
                                                                   
3
qq xx x h g g                                                        (A2.5) 
The supply elasticity of a product is defined as: 
                                                                S dq dp p q                                                      (A2.6) 
Combining equations (A2-2) to (A2-6), we get the sought result: 









                                                          (A2.7) 16 
 
Appendix 3: Formula for Market Leakage with a RED Policy under Autarky: An 
Interaction with the Land and Agricultural Markets 
 
Consider a competitive market where timber and agricultural produce are produced through 
technologies exhibiting decreasing returns to scale:   f and   g , respectively. The total area of 
available land L is fixed and is allocated between the forest LF and the agricultural sector LA. 
Although prior to the policy all forestry land is used for timber production, it, nevertheless, can 
be thought of as comprising of two parts: one that will be set aside in the future R and the other 
LT that will be used for timber harvest after the policy. By setting aside R hectares of forest, Z 
tonnes of timber per year are effectively withdrawn from the market and the amount of timber 
available for harvest is given by a fraction of total timber production coming from the land used 
for timber production.  
The model structure is as follows:  
  TF q f L                                                                                                                             (A3.1a) 
  AA q g L                                                                                                                             (A3.1b) 
  T T T c D P                                                                                                                            (A3.1c) 
  A A A c D P                                                                                                                           (A3.1d) 
  T T F T c L L q Z                                                                                                               (A3.1e) 
AA cq                                                                                                                                    (A3.1f)                                                                               
L T L f P P                                                                                                                                (A3.1g)                                                                                                                            
L A L g P P                                                                                                                               (A3.1h)                                                                                                                   
TF L R L                                                                                                                             (A3.1i) 
FA L L L 
                                                                                                                          (A3.1j)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
 
Equations a and b describe production and c and d consumption of timber and agricultural 
products, respectively. Equations e and f constitute equilibrium conditions in the timber and 
agricultural market, respectively. First-order conditions g and h determine demand for forest and 
agricultural land, respectively. Land rent is assumed to equalize in the equilibrium. Finally, 17 
 
equations i and j are land accounting identities. The former says that a part of total forest land 
will be allocated to timber production and the rest will be set aside, whereas the latter means that 
the total available land is allocated to forestry and agriculture. 
  Production and consumption is denoted by q and c, respectively, with subscripts T, A, F, 
and L standing for timber, agriculture, forest, and land respectively. Capital letters P and L 
denote price in the input and output markets and an area of land, respectively. The timber 
equivalent of the land set aside, Z, due to the RED policy is computed in the initial equilibrium 
as    FT Z R L q  and thus is exogenous.  
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                                                                              (A3.2) 
  Market leakage of a RED policy is defined as a change in the timber harvest resulting 
from a withdrawal of Z tonnes of timber from the market because of the policy. Mathematically, 
it is defined as: 
                                                                   
T
MT L dq dZ 
                                                    (A3.3) 
where  00 dZ Z Z     denotes a reduction in available timber due to the RED policy. In 
order to get a meaningful positive value of a market leakage, we place a negative sign in 18 
 
equation (A3.3). 
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Using the result from Appendix 2, equations from (A3-2), and after transformation of the 
derivatives into their elasticity form, we arrive at: 
                                      
  1 1 1 1
T DT
M






    

    
       
   
                             (A3.4) 
where      L T T T P L P q   ,      L T A A P L P q   , F RL   , and denotes an elasticity. 
In words, α represents a ratio of the cost a timber producing firm pays for renting the land to the 
revenues from marketing the timber. The parameter β is a ratio of rent for land on which timber 
is produced to the revenues of the agricultural sector. Finally, the parameter γ denotes a share of 
land that is set aside in total forestry land. 
 19 
 
Figure 1: Forestation Leakage with a RED Policy:                                   
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Figure 2a: Forestation Leakage with a RED Policy: Output Markets 
SA
Timber  market Agricultural  market
ST
DA
ST'                    
SA''                    
a                     b                     c                     d                    
SA'                    
quantity of timber quantity of agricultural production
price price
a                     b                     c                     d                    
PT PA






Z                    21 
 





















Figure 3: Avoided Emissions and Sequestration Profiles of Various 
RED-related Activities 
time
Incremental emissions  Cumulative emissions/sequestration
1. Avoided carbon emissions due to RED 2. Carbon sequestration due to RED
time T
























































3. Carbon sequestration due to afforestation 4. Carbon sequestration of afforestation on 
agricultural land
time time T
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